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AIR CARGO FUEL SURCHARGES AND TACIT
COLLUSION UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT: WHAT
GOOD IS CATCHING A FEW BAD GUYS IF
CONSUMERS STILL GET ROBBED?
DUSTIN APPEL*

FOR MOST of the last decade, the domino-like effect of the
rising cost of oil has created new pressures on industries and
markets throughout the global economy. The transportation
sector, in particular, has felt the strain of ever-increasing fuel
costs driven by oil prices that have now topped $100 per barrel.
In the airline industry, for example, fuel has replaced labor and
personnel as the largest single component of operating expenses. Shrinking margins have prompted transportation providers to search for new ways to pass on higher operating costs to
their customers without losing market share to competitors.
The widespread adoption of fuel surcharges on transportation services is one result. Airlines began to impose surcharges
on passenger and cargo service as early as 2000, and trucking
companies and railroads have followed a similar pattern. In response, freight forwarders, essential non-carrier service providers in the transportation supply chain, have also included fuel
surcharges in their rates.
From the start, shippers and regulators contested the imposition of fuel surcharges on air cargo with concerns that high
surcharges would persist even after fuel prices subsided and that
the calculation of the surcharges bears little relationship to the
actual fuel consumed during transport. This opposition, however, did little to counter the increasing rates of surcharges lev* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2009; B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 1997. The author would like to
thank his beloved wife, Natasha, who makes all of this possible, his parents,
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ied on cargo as fuel prices climbed. A pattern soon emerged as
carriers repeatedly adopted uniform rate increases within days
of one another, often according to an index of jet fuel prices
established by Lufthansa.
In early 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice and European
Community antitrust regulatory agencies launched ajoint global
investigation into alleged price-fixing in connection with fuel
surcharges on international airfreight shipments with a series of
raids and subpoenas on the major air cargo carriers. The worldwide investigation spawned at least twenty-three private class action lawsuits for antitrust claims, and ultimately led to guilty
pleas and criminal fines of over $700 million in the United
States for British Airways, Korean Air Lines, and Qantas Airways,
in addition to restitution payments on behalf of Lufthansa and
Virgin Atlantic. In October 2007, another series of subpoenas
and pre-dawn raids descended upon the offices of leading
freight forwarders as the global antitrust probe-already one of
the largest in history-widened.
So far, U.S. authorities have announced no new charges or
developments in connection with any criminal case against carriers or forwarders, but the probe continues, as do the civil lawsuits against carriers, which were eventually consolidated and
transferred to federal court in the Eastern District of New York.
Meanwhile, those in the air cargo industry, and those in the legal community concerned with antitrust issues, struggle to discern the implications of the criminal and civil litigation, and to
predict how the outcome of the civil suits could affect antitrust
regulation in the future.
The air cargo industry is a concentrated market with a relatively limited number of providers for international shipments.
In such oligopoly markets, the business decisions of the participants intertwine more closely than in dispersed markets, such
that patterns of parallel conduct often emerge seemingly without any overt communication between competitors. Because of
this so-called "tacit collusion," courts have historically struggled
to determine what level of conduct constitutes a violation of antitrust law in such markets, a difficulty commentators refer to as
"the oligopoly problem." The ongoing class action civil suits
present the courts with a new opportunity to confront this problem and to refine judicial treatment of collusion in oligopolistic
markets to better serve the goals of antitrust law.
This comment examines how courts have grappled with the
oligopoly problem and proposes the adoption of a new ap-

2008]

AIR CARGO FUEL SURCHARGES

377

proach in the context of the air cargo fuel surcharge litigation
to deal with the dilemma of tacit collusion to better protect consumers. Part One gives a general background on the tenets of
U.S. antitrust law and the oligopoly problem, while Part Two
provides an overview of the air cargo industry, the fuel
surcharge system, and the current criminal and civil litigation.
Part Three examines how the current approach toward tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets, with its overweening focus on the
element of conspiracy, fails to address the impact of anticompetitive behavior upon consumers, and how a proposed approach
composed of a mixture of theories previously put forward by
scholars will remedy this gap in protection.
The current approach toward application of antitrust law toward tacit collusion is somewhat akin to a near-sighted police
officer patrolling the sidewalk-only the most blatant wrongdoers are punished, while those on the blurry edge of the field of
vision escape. While catching bad actors is a worthy goal, ultimately it means little to consumers if the harmful behavior continues. An understanding of why the current approach toward
oligopolistic markets disserves the very consumers it is designed
to protect first requires a brief overview of the statutes that comprise U.S. antitrust law.
I.

ANTI-TRUST LAW AND THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM
A. THE SHERMAN ACT
In the United States, the principal statutes that govern antitrust liability are the Sherman Act,' the Clayton Act, 2 and the
Federal Trade Commission Act.' However, since the Clayton
Act narrowly focuses on tying agreements and exclusive-dealing
arrangements,4 and the Federal Trade Commission Act specifically excludes air carriers from its scope, 5 it is the Sherman Act
that primarily delineates illegal, anticompetitive conduct by airlines. The goal of passage of the Sherman Act was to protect
consumers from the abuse of concentrated economic power.6
Criminal sanctions are normally limited to price-fixing cases,
I Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
2 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000).

3 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
4 See6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
1400a (2d ed. 2003).
5 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (2000).
6 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 3 (4th ed. 2003).
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since courts more often construe the statute as a civil and regulatory law.7 In broad terms, the law prohibits restraints on trade
and commerce and bars illegal monopolization, but unlike most
criminal statutes, the Sherman Act does not precisely define
conduct that constitutes a violation.8 Rather, the statute appears
to be imbued with a "generality and adaptability" similar to that
of a constitutional provision. 9 While this flexibility is perhaps
essential to deal effectively with the complexity of evolving business practices, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Sherman Act's criminal provisions should be reserved for instances
"where the law [is] relatively clear and the conduct egregious"
to prevent abuse."0
Turning to the specific language of the statute, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act ("Section 1") forbids "[e]very contract, combination .

.

. or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce,"

and explicitly governs commercial activity both among the states
and with foreign nations.11 While this broad language could
conceivably encompass all private contracts, such a literal approach has consistently drawn rejection.1 2 Instead, relying upon
earlier common law notions that undergird the statute, 13 the Supreme Court has ruled that only "unreasonable restraints" on4
interstate or foreign commerce constitute violations of the Act.'
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, as
well as attempts and conspiracies to monopolize, in interstate or
foreign commerce. 5 In this context, monopolization signifies
conduct-alone or as part of a group-to acquire or maintain
the power to exclude competitors from any part of trade or
commerce in a given commodity.16 Although the government
(or a private plaintiff) need not show actual exclusion of any
potential or existing rival, illegal monopolization requires evidence of specific intent to exercise the power to eliminate com7 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 164
(2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).
8 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
9 Id. at 439 (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,

359-60 (1933)).
10 Id.
11 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
12
13
14

15
16

Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
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petition. 17 Since Section 2 governs extreme concentrations of
economic power not seen in the airline industry, the remainder
of this comment will focus upon the ramifications of Section 1.
Although the wide-ranging prohibition of Section 1 expressly
lists contracts, combinations, and conspiracies,18 the prevailing
view is that these terms are practically indistinguishable, and
courts use them interchangeably to describe the same conduct.' 9 Regardless of this terminology, conspiracy to violate Section 1 constitutes a completely separate offense.20 Some form of
concerted action, however, is required to sustain either a conspiracy or a completed violation under Section 1, as the existence of an "agreement is an essential
ingredient of [a] contract,
21
combination, or conspiracy.

Thus, any offense under this section requires first an "agreement,

. .

.understanding,

. .

.or a meeting of the minds"22 be-

tween "at least two legally distinct economic entities."2 "
Secondly, the agreement must have either the purpose or objective of unreasonably restraining trade.24 Once these elements
exist, the agreement standing alone is an offense as a conspiracy
to violate Section 1.25 Neither successful completion nor any
overt act furthering the conspiracy is required to constitute an
offense. 26 A completed violation of Section 1 requires these additional elements: 1) that the agreement unreasonably restrained interstate trade or commerce; and 2) in criminal
prosecutions, intent to restrain trade or commerce.27
To demonstrate an illegal conspiracy in violation of Section 1,
plaintiffs or prosecutors may show direct evidence of an express
17 Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
& HARRISON, supra note 6, at 179. See also, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 1977).
20 See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991).
21 SULLIVAN & HARIwSON, supra note 6,at 179 (quoting Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HArrv. L. REv. 655, 655-56 (1962).
18

19 SULLIVAN

22 Id.

Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.
2000).
24 Capital Imaging Assocs., Inc. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs. Inc., 996 F.2d
537, 542 (2d Cir. 1993).
25 Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 330.
26 United States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1270 (6th Cir. 1995).
27 Meghan Edwards-Ford & Matthew J. McDonald, Antitrust Violations, 44 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 241, 243 (2007).
23

380

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

agreement between the defendants, 28 or may present sufficient
indirect or circumstantial evidence to infer the existence of an
implied agreement. 29 The degree of evidence necessary to sustain an inference of an implied agreement is a vital issue in most
cases, particularly to survive motions for acquittal or summary
judgment.3 0 Evidence of the objective to achieve an unreasonable restraint on commerce is generally far more relevant than
that of the individual motives of the participants in the conspiracy, unless no other proof of a common purpose is available. 1
To give effect in practice to the intent of the broad language
of the Sherman Act, federal courts have developed two distinct
tests to identify conduct that violates Section 1 as an unreasonable restraint: the per se rule, which applies to blatantly anticompetitive acts, and an individualized balancing test known as the
"rule of reason" for less egregious conduct. 32 Per se violations
are those constraints on trade that have "manifestly anticompetitive" effects3 3 and that threaten the proper operation of the free

market by restricting competition and decreasing supply.34 Examples of such conduct include territory-splitting arrangements
and horizontal price-fixing agreements between competitors. 5
Under this analysis, the factfinder must weigh the totality of circumstances in the case to determine whether the restrictive
practice at issue should constitute a violation as an unreasonable
restraint.36 Factors include the attributes of the particular business or businesses, such as market power held, 37 and the "history, nature, and effect" of the practice in question. 3 8 The crux
of this analysis is whether the practice generates an economic
28 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 219 (1940)
(finding evidence of an express agreement between defendants to purchase gasoline to curtail supply and increase price).
29 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1990).
30 See, e.g., id.; Lovett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 998 F.2d 575, 580-81 (8th Cir.
1993).
31 Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 212-14 (3d Cir.
1992).
32 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387
(1956).
33 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
34 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
35 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007).
36 Id. at 2712; Cont' TV, 433 U.S. at 49.
37 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
- State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
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benefit or harm to the consumer through its impact on
competition. 9
Application of the rule of reason is favored over per se analysis, especially where the economic impact of questioned business relationships is not immediately obvious.4 ° The Supreme
Court has noted that the per se rule is appropriate only in circumstances in which the courts have demonstrable experience
with a certain practice and can confidently predict that it would
be found invalid in almost all cases under the rule of reason.41
Further, any "departure from the rule-of-reason standard must
be based [on a] demonstrable economic effect" on the consumer.4 2 Consequently, even restraints that closely resemble per
se violations-such as horizontal agreements between competitors that border on price-fixing 43 -still merit a weighing of competitive significance to determine whether the restraint fosters
or hinders competition.44
Base point pricing is an example of a business practice that
the courts have found can produce an anticompetitive effect
that rises to the level of an unreasonable restraint on trade.45
Under one example of this scheme, sellers of cement could sell
product to their customers only on a "delivered price" basis, defined as the cost of the product plus freight charges from a set
"base point" to the customer's destination, regardless of both
where the cement originated and the actual freight costs of delivery to destination.4 6 Thus, a seller's returns on sales rose as
destinations grew farther from the base point and diminished as
they approached the base. 47 The system ultimately produced
39 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713.

Id. (citing State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10).
Id.
42 Id. (quoting Cont'l T.V, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)).
43 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
44 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). This
analysis represents a more focused, narrower scope than the traditional rule of
reason. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 137-38.
45 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700 (1948).
Although this case alleged violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) for unfair trade practices, the Court found that, if
unregulated, this practice could destroy competition market-wide and result in a
monopoly in the cement industry. Id. To support this assertion, the Court
pointed to two of its prior cases brought under the Sherman Act: United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) and Sugar Institute., Inc. v. United States, 297
U.S. 553 (1936). Id. at 720-21.
46 Id. at 698.
47 Id.
40

41
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uniform prices and terms of sale throughout the country, since
members of the conspiracy could manipulate the aspect of
"phantom freight" to impose intolerable losses on recalcitrant
sellers, while incurring minimal losses themselves.4" The resulting uniformity of prices became so stark that in one case, eleven
purportedly independent, sealed bids
for sale of cement were
49
identical within fractions of a cent.
The exchange of commercial information between competitors is an example of a practice that defies such easy categorization but can constitute a violation under the rule of reason
depending upon its impact on competition.5 " Important factors
in this determination are the nature of the information exchanged, how the businesses involved react, and, perhaps most
importantly, the structure of the relevant industry. 51 For example, the courts have generally sanctioned the exchange of market-wide historical information as beneficial to commerce,52 but
have found disclosure of anticipated market conditions and information about current transactions more problematic due to
the danger of collusion between the participants. 53 Subsequent
moves by competitors to match new prices or refusals to deal
with "black-listed" vendors or customers are indications of collusive intent, though not necessarily dispositive standing alone.54
Lastly, the requisite impact on competition required under the
rule of reason will most likely be present in highly concentrated
industries, markets with inelastic demand, and markets for fungible goods where the primary differentiating factor between
competitors is price.55 However, unique difficulties arise in the
48 See id. at 713-14. The cartel's method of enforcement was to establish a
rogue seller's plant as an involuntary base point, which forced the seller to incur
excessive freight charges on every shipment. Id.
49 Id. at 713.
50 See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598-605 (1936) (distinguishing statistical information exchanged between suppliers from notice of
contemplated or future price changes).
51 SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 148.
52 See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586
(1925).
53 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335-37 (1969).
54 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280
(1968)).
5 Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 337 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940)). This impact may not always manifest itself
in an increase in prices but rather price stabilization, another form of market
manipulation prohibited by the Sherman Act. Id.
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case of oligopolies-highly
concentrated markets dominated by
56
a few large sellers.

B.

THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM

Courts and antitrust regulators have wrestled with the conundrum of anticompetitive oligopoly conduct for over a century.5 v
The difficulty in identifying illegal activity in these markets
stems from the interconnected nature of decision-making in an
oligopoly, where the optimal level of price and output for one
member depends on the choices made by the other members.58
Because of this intersection of interests, oligopolistic markets
will often display coordinated pricing and correlated actions by
participants. 59 For example, information about planned or actual price changes by one provider can cause market-wide movements as others act to match the new price level. ° Such
synchronized behavior in recognition of the interdependence of
the market players and their shared economic interests, sometimes called tacit collusion or conscious parallelism, is currently
legal, 61 so long as the correlated action is the result of "a rational, independent calculus by each member," and not the
product of affirmative agreement between the actors.62 The
danger in oligopolistic markets from this behavior lies in the
possibility that such concerted action-legal action, with no express agreement-will raise prices to the same level as if the
market were a monopoly, dominated by a single supplier. 63 The
limited number of firms in the market facilitates coordinated
56 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at
1429a. For a detailed discussion of
the economics of oligopolistic markets, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,
at 404.
57 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws,
89 MINN. L. Rhv. 9, 9 (2004).
58 Williamson Oil Co., v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1299 n.11 (11th
Cir. 2003).
59 Id. at 1299 (citing Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
300 (1966) (Stewart,J., dissenting)).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C.
1993). In this case, federal regulators charged eight airlines with using a central
clearinghouse on rate levels to coordinate changes in fares. Id.
61 Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 227.
62 Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1299. There are no cases where conscious
parallelism alone has been sufficient to establish a violation of Section 1. Piraino,
supra note 57, at 70 n.72.
63 Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. RFv. 508, 512 (1985).
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action toward an excessive price by simultaneously reducing
both the risk of price increases and the potential rewards of
price reductions by any one member.64
To a consumer, however, there is no practical difference between a non-competitive price set by an explicit pact among sellers and one arrived at by tacit collusion-the end result on the
pocketbook is the same.65 Yet, while courts would likely condemn a blatant agreement to fix prices as a per se violation,66
consciously parallel action-even though it yields an identical
economic effect-would escape prosecution. This gap in the
protections afforded by the antitrust laws has been called by
some "the oligopoly problem. '"67

Thus far, the courts have been reluctant to fill this gap.6 In
fact, because some markets are inherently oligopolistic, the federal courts and antitrust commentators have concluded that
truly independent parallel conduct must be protected to preserve economic efficiency.69 The result is that currently the key
factor in determining violations of Section 1 in oligopolistic
markets is the existence or absence of an agreement between the
market participants to engage in anticompetitive behavior, and
not the anticompetitive conduct itself nor its effects upon the
consumer. 0 Indeed, when considered, the actual behavior and
its market effects are often employed only as circumstantial evi64 Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace, III, Conspiratologistsat the Gate: The Scope of
Expert Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracy in a Sherman Act Case, 17 ANTITRUST 36,
37 n.5 (2003). Of course, this is a gross over-simplification of the economics
underlying pricing strategies in oligopolistic markets. For further background,
including the effect of game theory on this analysis, seejonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated CompetitiveEffects Under the Antitrust
Laws, 77 N.Y.U.L. REv. 135 (2002).
65 Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 423, 437
(1997).
66

Id.

67

Piraino, supra note 57, at 13.

- Id. at 12.
Id. at 45. The most notable proponent of this view is Professor Donald Turner, whose views reflected the so-called "Harvard" school of thought on antitrust
enforcement. See generally Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARVr. L. Riv 655 (1962).
70 See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that pattern of
interdependent pricing alone could not constitute antitrust violation, but can be
used to support an inference of an agreement to raise or stabilize prices).
69
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dence to establish the existence of an illegal agreement.7 This
undue focus on the conspiracy element of Section 1 has caused
the federal courts to struggle in their efforts to discern legitimate parallel-yet-independent action from unlawful collusion in
practical terms, especially with regard to the level of evidence
required to survive summary judgment.
The Supreme Court attempted to define this standard with
the ruling that a plaintiff must present sufficiently unambiguous
evidence "'that tends to exclude the possibility"' of independent
action." This apparent adoption in Matsushita of the premise
that conscious parallelism alone could not constitute a violation
of Section 1 triggered a search for various "plus factors" that
would provide evidence of conduct that was more than simply
tacit collusion sufficient to allow a Section 1 case to proceed to
trial.73 Examples of such "plus factors" include evidence that
each defendant acted contrary to its own economic self-interest
or in a manner inexplicable in the absence of an illegal agreement, and any evidence that would "exclude the possibility of
independent action."74 The business-justification test, another
common "plus factor," can be met if defendants are unable to
show independent, legitimate business reasons for engaging in
the questioned practice.75 Once enough "plus factors" to infer
the existence of an agreement are found, courts normally apply
the per se rule of illegality, with little or no further examination
of the underlying practices employed.76 Instead of providing
any real guidance, however, this elevation of the conspiracy inquiry over economic effect has caused the courts to render a
series of conflicting opinions that has, at best, confused many as
to the line between permissible and impermissible oligopoly

71 See, e.g., id. (holding announcements of price increases among competitors
and subsequent pattern of parallel pricing are sufficient to support inference of
illegal agreement).
72 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
73 See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (I1th
Cir. 1991).
74 Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir.
2003).
75 Vaska, supra note 63, at 520, 520 n.82 (surveying various federal circuit
courts' application of the business-justification test).
76 Id. at 509.
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in
conduct,7 7 or, at worst, perhaps even encouraged participants
78
concentrated markets to engage in tacit collusion.
C.

POSNER'S PROPOSED APPROACH

Not all scholars agree that tacit collusion should fall outside
the ambit of the antitrust law, however. Most notably, Judge
Richard Posner argued during formative debates on the subject
that since there is no intrinsic difference between formal cartels
and tacit arrangements, and since conscious parallelism is still
voluntary action, it should be punished in the same way as express collusion. 9 In fact, he concluded that tacit behavior could
be even more detrimental because it is easier to conceal.8 0 This

is even more likely with today's technology, when conspirators
can enforce their agreements through subtle signals in press releases and on web sites."1
To overcome this evidentiary hurdle, Posner proposed a twostep approach to evaluate suspected collusive behavior. The
first step is to examine the structure of the market at the
macroeconomic level to gauge its susceptibility to collusive activity.8 2 Among the factors that indicate a favorable climate for collusion are a concentration of large sellers, a lack of small, fringe
sellers, inelastic demand at the competitive price, significant
barriers to entry into the market, a standardized product, and
emphasis on price over other forms of competition.8 3 The second prong of the proposed test is to inspect actual data in the
market to determine if patterns indicative of collusion exist.84
Posner identified evidence of collusion in exchanges of price
information, consistent levels and patterns of profits, and basepoint pricing.8 5

Although never applied in practice, this approach displays
both obvious advantages and drawbacks. In Posner's view, one
of the main benefits would be the shift in focus away from wideranging searches for smoking-gun documentation of illegal
77

78

Piraino, supra note 57, at 24.

Id. at 32.

79 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21

STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1575 (1969). Judge Posner's views are said to reflect the
"Chicago" school of thought on antitrust enforcement. See generally id.
80 Id.

81 Piraino, supra note 57, at 30.
82 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN
83 Id. at 55-60.
84 Id. at 55.
85 Id. at 62-70.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE,

55 (1976).
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agreements, which he termed the "cops-and-robbers" method of
prosecuting antitrust violations, 6 to center judicial inquiry on
the ultimate impact of the questioned conduct on consumers.87
Unfortunately, in place of "hot document" evidence, this approach could require litigants to introduce expensive and "often
ambiguous" economic data subject to varying expert interpretation to sustain their cases. 8 Further, Posner conceded that the
reach of the approach could extend too far, for example, to encompass industry reaction to cost increases common to all participants.8 9 He therefore cautioned that tacit collusion should
be condemned only when it causes a demonstrable anticompetitive effect on the market.9"
D.

PIRAINO'S PROPOSED APPROACH

Seeking to refine this analysis and synthesize the divergent
schools of thought on antitrust treatment, antitrust scholar
Thomas Piraino, Jr., has advocated a purpose-based approach to
oligopoly pricing cases. 91 Under this proposed test, a court or
regulatory agency would infer an illegal conspiracy when participants in oligopolistic markets engage in conduct "contrary to
their immediate self-interest and [that] makes no economic
sense other than as an invitation to join in a price-fixing or market-allocation arrangement. '9 2 Piraino specifically identifies
price-signaling-announcements of planned price increases
that risk immediate loss of revenue or profits-as behavior that
would sustain such an inference, particularly when followed by
competitors.9" The purpose-based test would deem an initiating
firm's announcement an illegal offer to participate in a pricefixing scheme in violation of Section 1, and the subsequent reId. at 47.
Id. at 54-55.
88 Vaska, supra note 63, at 515. Vaska refers to an admission by Posner that
economic evidence "frequently is ambiguous." Id.; Richard A. Posner, Oligopolistic PricingSuits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor Markovits,
28 STAN. L. REV. 903, 910 (1976).
89 POSNER, supra note 82, at 72.
90 Id. For a more thorough discussion of Posner's reasoning, especially in relation to the competing assertion that tacit collusion should be legal, espoused by
Professor Donald Turner (the so-called "Chicago" versus "Harvard" schools of
thought), see Vaska, supra note 63, at 510-17.
91 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvardand Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Centuiy, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 382 (2007).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 383.
86
87
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sponse by competitors as acceptance, thereby completing the elements of conspiracy.94 To survive summary judgment under
this proposal, the court would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that one or more firms in an oligopoly market signaled its
pricing intentions contrary to its individual self-interest and that
all other participants followed suit in a manner no less contrary
to their own self-interests.95 In Piraino's view, this would free
the courts from the "fruitless search for plus factors" while still
extending the scope of the law to reach the sort of harmful, tacit
behavior that currently escapes punishment. 6 Further, adoption of such an approach would recognize a continuum of treatment of antitrust cases, in which the degree of inquiry should
vary appropriately in relation to the competitive effects of the
behavior at issue.97
While Piraino's approach may not be immune from criticism,
the underlying assumption-that the current approach of the
courts does not adequately protect consumers in accord with
the purpose of the antitrust laws and provides no clear guidance
to businesses as to prohibited practices8-is valid. In fact, the
need for better, more sharply tailored regulation of certain pricing behaviors in oligopolistic markets is on stark display in the
current criminal and civil investigations into fuel surcharges levied on international air cargo providers. A brief overview of the
air cargo industry itself and the basis of the suits will show why
this is so.
II.

THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY AND THE FUEL
SURCHARGE LAWSUITS
A.

THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY

Airlines form a vital link in the transportation of cargo worldwide. Some specialized airlines engage exclusively in cargo operations, but even most passenger airlines also move freight on
their flights or maintain separate fleets of cargo jets." Because
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.

at 382-83.

Id. at 347.
98 Piraino, supra note 57, at 32.
97
-

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,

OECD

WORKSHOP ON REGULATORY

REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO TRANSPORTATION,

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

17-18 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/28/1821288.pdf
[hereinafter OECD]. Lufthansa, Korean Airlines, and British Ainvays rank
among the leading international air cargo carriers worldwide. Id.
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airfreight normally provides the shortest delivery-time of any
mode of transport-but at a significantly higher cost-it is often
preferred for shipments of perishable goods or time-sensitive
items.' 00 The prevalence of high-value, compact goods shipped
by air also results from the fact that the physical volume of
goods shipped, as opposed to their weight, often drives the cost
of airfreight due to the limited availability of cargo space.' 01
These factors normally help insulate the air cargo industry from
10 2
competition from other modes of transport.
A small number of major airlines tend to dominate the carriage of airfreight, leading to a concentrated market.10 3 However, the airline industry as a whole is normally competitive, as
evidenced by the fact that price increases by a single carrier are
not generally sustainable unless most competitors move to
match.' 04 Price is often the main differentiating factor between
competitors, since airfreight is intrinsically fungible, in that
cargo space on one plane is no different from that on any other
plane bound to a particular destination. The airlines sell a majority of their cargo capacity to freight forwarders, who then
10 5
serve as a link between carriers and shippers.

100 Id. at 24. Examples include electronic components, cut flowers, live plants,
seafood, and apparel. Id.
101 Airfreight rates are charged per kilogram on the greater of actual weight or
dimensional weight of the cargo, and dimensional weight is determined by multiplying height times length times width, then dividing the product by a pre-set
factor. American Airlines, Glossary of Cargo Terms, https://www.aacargo.com/
utility/glossary.jhtml#d (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
102 See Ian Putzger, Pick Your Poison; Fuel, Security Surcharges Are Likely to Offset
Rate ReductionsforAir-cargoShippersJ. CoM.,Jan. 7, 2008, at 90 (noting that higher
airfreight prices due to rising fuel costs could drive "traditional airfreight commodities" toward ocean carriage).
103 OECD, supra note 99, at 18 (indicating that the top twenty-five carriers control seventy-five percent of the market).
104 See Baker, supra note 64, at 168. Baker describes the role of Northwest Airlines in thwarting a price increase on round-trip fares initiated by Continental
Airlines in February 2000. However, the anecdote also reveals that Continental
successfully led the implementation of an increased fuel surcharge just three
weeks earlier. Id. at 166-67.
105 Andreea Popescu, Air Cargo Revenue and Capacity Management ix (Dec.
2006) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology) (on file
with School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology), availableat http://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/1853/14119/1/popescu
_andreea_200612_phd.pdf.pdf.
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THE ROLE OF FREIGHT FORWARDERS

International freight forwarders function as agents on behalf
of shippers to arrange a wide array of transportation services,
including booking space with carriers, completing export documentation, tracking shipments en route, and assisting with customs clearance." 6 As an industry, freight forwarders fall into
three broad categories based on their respective modes of transport: ocean, surface, and air.'0 7 Freight forwarders who handle
international air shipments must be licensed by the International Air Transport Association ("IATA").108 Freight forwarders
do not generally own and operate their own ships, trucks, or
airplanes, but instead buy freight positions from carriers. 10 9
Much the same as the international air carrier market, the international freight forwarding industry is also concentrated, particularly because of the increasing convergence of "traditional"
freight forwarders and air express integrators."'
The industry forms a vital link in the air cargo supply chain as
an interface between shippers of cargo and the airlines. This
occurs because of the high capital investment costs that force
the airlines to plan flight schedules and cargo capacity many
months in advance, even though the actual demand for space
on any given flight becomes certain only a few days before departure.1 1 Freight forwarders facilitate this planning process by
entering into long-term contracts to purchase cargo space on
scheduled flights six to twelve months in advance, thus assuming
the risk of loss for unused space.1 1 2 The freight forwarders in
turn book cargoes on behalf of their shipper-clients on flights as
they occur. Both shippers and carriers benefit from this system:
106 OECD, supra note 99, at 18-19.

107James Giermanski & David Neipert, The Re-regulation of FreightForwarders in
the USA and Its Impact on the USA-Mexico Border, 9 CuR, Ers: INT'L TRADE L.J. 11,
11 (2000).
108 Export.gov, What is a Freight Forwarder?, http://www.export.gov/logistics/exp_whatis_freight forwarder.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
109 See, e.g., EXPEDITORS INT'L OF WASH., INC., 2006 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 64
(2007).
110 See, e.g., DHL Logistics CEO Rejects Talk of Corporate Break-up, TRANSPORT IN-

TELLIGENCE, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://transportintelligence.com/briefs/
See also OECD, supra
dhI-logistics-ceo-rejects-talk-of-corporate-break-up/1301.
note 99, at 20.
III Ek-Peng Chew, Huei-Chuen Huang, Ellis L. Johnson, George L.
Nemhauser, Joel S. Sokol & Chun-How Leong, Short-term Booking of Air Cargo
Space, 174 EUR. J. OF OPERATIONAL Rs., 1380 (2006).
112 Id.
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airlines sell their freight space in large blocks to the forwarders,
who can then offer lower per-kilogram freight rates to shippers
by consolidating multiple small cargoes.1 13 Thus, in addition to
being a conduit between shipper and carrier, freight forwarders
to some extent influence the prevailing airfreight rate paid by
the shipper.
C.

AIR CARGO RATES

Air cargo accounts for twelve to fourteen percent of worldwide airline revenues, amounting to roughly $55 billion in
2006.114 U.S. airlines generated at least forty percent of this

global figure in 2006, or $22 billion. 115 Driven by the volume of
movement of goods across international borders, air cargo revenues generally track fluctuations in the value of world trade.' 16
Using this indicator, industry economists predict that airfreight
revenues will continue to grow for the next several years at approximately five percent per annum through 2011, a rate of
growth not as robust as in the recent past." 7 In part, this projected decline is a result of the boost in revenues seen in 2005
and 2006-even in the face of lower traffic volumes-attributed
by analysts to the "pricing power" airlines exerted in 8passing on
11
higher fuel costs to customers through surcharges.
Projections also show a sharp decline in profitability in the
airline industry as a whole. At the time of this writing, profits for
2007, from both passenger and cargo operations, are estimated
to be $5.6 billion worldwide.' 19 While 2008 profits had once
been forecast to be over $7 billion, the industry now expects to
reap only $5 billion.1 20 While the credit crunch stemming from
the meltdown of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market is noted

113 Stephen Dolan, Reforn of Air Cargo Transport Regulation Through the WTO and
GATS, 29 TRANsp. LJ. 189, 204 (2002).
114 International Air Transport Association, Air Freight Market Outlook (Sept.
2007), http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/CE373AB8-10934192-A8929C559F57CA29/0/CargoMarketOutlookSepO7.pdf [hereinafter IATA].
115 AiR TRANSP. AsS'N, 2007 ECONoMic REPORT 21 (2007), available at http://
www.airlines.org/NR/rdonlyres/0E9E7072-ECC6-4CED-8B8E-6857256935E7/0/
2007AnnualReport.pdf.
116 LATA, supra note 114, at 2.
117 Id.

118 Id. at 6.
119 International'Air Transport Association, Financial Forecast (Dec. 2007),

http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/DA8ACB38-676F-4DB1-A2ACF5BCEF74CB2C/0/IndustryOutlookDecember07.pdf.
120 Id.
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as one cause, the primary driver is the increasing price of oil,
121
which in turn drives up the cost of aviation fuel.
D.

FUEL COSTS AND FUEL SURCHARGES

Passenger and cargo airliners operate on a specialized petroleum-based, kerosene-type fuel generally referred to as 'let A"
or 'Jet A-1.'12 2 Current market rates, or "spot-prices," for kerosene-type jet fuel on a delivered basis at various locations are
regularly tracked and published by the U.S. Department of Energy. 123 As of December 2007, the spot-price for jet fuel in the
Los Angeles market was $2.66 per gallon, 124 a near-record high,
since prices have only exceeded $2.30 per gallon twice before,
25
including a spike in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.1
Since 2000,
average annual jet fuel prices have climbed over 200
26
percent. 1
Fuel costs are now responsible for thirty percent of airline operating costs overall, eclipsing even labor costs, which were once
the largest single line item of operating expense in the industry. 127 Because fuel accounts for a larger percentage of operat12
ing costs for freight transport than for passenger service,
airfreight rates should naturally be more sensitive to fluctuations
in fuel prices.
As early as 2000, some airlines reacted to increasing fuel costs
with the introduction of fuel surcharges into their rates on both
passenger and cargo fares in an attempt to recoup falling profits. Eventually, more and more air carriers added similar
121

Id.

122 Air

Transport Association, Alternative Fuels Q&A, http://www.airlines.org/
economics/energy/altfuelsqanda.htm (last visited July 4, 2008).
123 Energy Information Administration, Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-pri-spt-sl-m.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008).
124 Energy Information Administration, Monthly Los Angeles Kerosene-Type
Jet Fuel Spot Prices, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rjetlam.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008).
125Michael Fabey; IATA Slashes Profit Forecast, SHIPPING DIG., Jan. 14, 2008, at
wP.
126 Energy Information Administration, Annual Los Angeles CA KeroseneType Jet Fuel Spot Prices, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rjetlaa.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2008). The delivered price of kerosene-type jet fuel in the
Los Angeles market rose from $.94 to $2.20 a gallon. Id.
127 International Air Transport Association, Economic Briefing: Airline Fuel
and Labour Costs Share (June 2007), http://www.iata.org/NRlrdonlyres/
4A49F6DA-2B 12-48A9-A283-EO35AEA5D 165/0/AirlineLabourCostShare.pdf.
128 IATA, supra note 114, at 5.
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surcharges to their rates as well. By 2006, the practice had
spread throughout the entire industry and remains especially
significant among carriers servicing international cargo routes.
Generally, every international cargo carrier calculates the fuel
surcharge in the same manner: as an add-on charge to the
stated fare on a per-kilogram basis. 129 For example, a fuel
surcharge of $.10 per kilogram would yield a total charge of $1
on a shipment of 100 kilograms of chargeable weight. Because
the surcharge varies by the shipment's chargeable weight regardless of origin or destination, there is no practical relationship between the weight and size of cargo shipped and the fuel
actually consumed by an airliner carrying them. Two cargo
freighters transporting identical loads out of Dallas-Fort Worth
airport theoretically generate the same fuel surcharge revenue,
even if one is bound for Frankfurt and the other for Moscow, a
flight of an extra 1,250 miles.130
Airlines almost uniformly use some index of various spot
prices for fuel to set the rate of the fuel surcharge over time.
The methodology employed by American Airlines is a good example. According to its website, the beginning point is an index
of the spot price of kerosene-type jet fuel calculated by averaging the weekly spot rates in the New York Harbor, U.S. Gulf
Coast, Los Angeles, Rotterdam, and Singapore markets. 3 ' The
index is then compared to a stair-stepped table of "triggerpoints" tied to various dollar-per-kilogram levels. If the index
rises above or falls below a given trigger-point for two consecutive weeks, the fuel surcharge is increased or diminished accordingly. As oil prices have driven up the cost of jet fuel, the fuel
surcharge has risen apace. From November 2006 to January
2008, the fuel surcharge quoted by American Airlines has3 2almost
doubled, from $.50 per kilogram to $.80 per kilogram.
Anticompetitive concerns about fuel surcharges appeared almost from the start. Federal regulators in the United States re129 American Airlines Cargo Fuel Surcharge Instructions, https://www.aacargo.com/shipping/fuelsurcharge.jhtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
130 See Sheremetyevo Airport, Alternate Airports, http://www.ifly.com/sheremetyevo-international-airport#overview (last visited Jan. 23, 2008) (at an average
fuel-usage rate of 19 liters per mile for a typical freighter, this amounts to a difference of $16,625 at the current spot-price of jet fuel); Boeing, Commercial Airplanes-747 Fun Facts, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/pf/pf
facts.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008); Monthly Los Angeles Kerosene-Type Jet
Fuel Spot Prices, supra note 124.
13, American Airlines Cargo Fuel Surcharge Instructions, supra note 129.
132

Id.
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jected an early proposal in 2000 from IATA to levy a uniform
industry-wide fuel surcharge based on an index of spot-fuel
prices with the conclusion that the practice was "fundamentally
flawed and unfair to shippers. "133 The regulators particularly
criticized the use of an index based on spot-prices as improper,
since most airlines have long-term fuel contracts and employ
hedging to manage their fuel costs, and predicted that high
surcharges would persist even after fuel prices fell. 34 In the
wake of the rejection, airlines continued to implement
surcharges independently, without any coordination or cover
from IATA, which enjoys limited immunity from U.S. antitrust
laws.135 Most airlines pegged their increases in fuel surcharges
to a fuel spot-price index developed by Lufthansa, while a few
3 6
developed their own indexes.1
Over time, the level of fuel surcharges on international shipments mounted. From May 2004 to October 2005, the level rose
from $.20 per kilogram to $.60 per kilogram-a rate that in
some cases equaled the base airfreight fare, effectively doubling
the cost of freight.1 37 Carriers applied respective increases in
almost perfect lockstep. A complaint filed by shippers in federal
court in California documents one instance that illustrates this
pattern of uniform increases: in early February 2006, fourteen of
the largest international air cargo carriers announced increases
in their fuel surcharges from existing levels of $.45, or .45 euros,
to new levels of $.50, or .50 euros, per kilogram.' 8
E.

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

In early 2006, U.S. and European authorities commenced a
joint global investigation into possible antitrust violations cen133 John R. Wilke, Daniel Michaels & MaryJacoby, Lufthansa to Co-operate in AirCargo Investigation;Deal in U.S. Could Be Breakthrough in Price-fixingProbe; Objections
to Fuel Surcharges, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Mar. 8, 2006, at B13.
134 Id.

135 Id.
136 SeeJohn D. Boyd, SurchargesFilling Up, TRArIC WORLD, May 1, 2006, at 42;

David Knibb & Peter Conway, Cargo Probe Focuses on Surcharges,AIRLINE Bus., Apr.
1, 2006 ("Many airlines openly admit that they calculate their surcharges based
on the fuel price index published on the Lufthansa Cargo website since 2000.").
137 Laa L. Sowinski, Air Cargo Industiy Anxious to Recover in 2006; Shippers Stand
to Gain as Industry Tackles High Fuel Costs and Competition From Other Transportation
Modes, 19 WORLD TRADE 38 (2006).
138 Complaint at 19, Printing Techs., Inc. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. CV061489 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006). Among those named in the complaint were Lufthansa, Korean Air, and British Airways. Id.
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tered on fuel surcharges on passenger and cargo service with
coordinated raids and service of warrants in various jurisdictions."' The investigations bore fruit in August 2007, when the
U.S. Department of Justice announced that British Airways and
Korean Airlines had each agreed to plead guilty to violations of
the Sherman Act, and to pay criminal fines of $300 million each
for their roles in a price-fixing conspiracy involving fuel
surcharges on both passenger and cargo operations. 4 ° Soon after, Qantas Airways entered a similar plea agreement that stipuin price
lated to criminal fines of $61 million for its involvement
141
shipments.
airfreight
fixing on international
In all three cases, the Department of Justice expressly conditioned the plea agreements on the continued cooperation of
the airlines in ongoing antitrust investigations involving internatioAal air cargo transportation.142 The respective plea agreements also averred that, had the case gone to trial, the
government would have presented evidence that executives of
the airlines acted to further the price-fixing conspiracy through
attendance at meetings and discussions with executives from
other major international air carriers during a period stretching
Aside from this, however, the plea agreefrom 2000 to 2006.'
ments and publicly available information provide no hint as to
the nature and extent of this evidence.' 44 There was early speculation that the evidence indicated the collusion began among
European carriers, with U.S. airlines then moving to match the
Knibb & Conway, supra note 136; Martin Coleman & Peter Scott, Antitrust
"Victims" Open New Front, LEGAL WK., Oct. 26, 2006.
140 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, British Airways PLC and Korean Air
Lines Co. Ltd. Agree to Plead Guilty and Pay Criminal Fines Totaling $600 Million For Fixing Prices on Passenger and Cargo Flights (Aug. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2007/224928.pdf.
141 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Qantas Airways Agrees to Plead Guilty
and Pay Criminal Fines For Fixing Prices on Cargo Shipments (Nov. 27, 2007),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07-at -943.html.
142 Plea Agreement, United States v. Qantas Airways Ltd., No. 07-00322-JDB
(D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases//f229200/
229266.htm; Plea Agreement, United States v. British Airways PLC, No. 07-183
JDB (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://wvw.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f225500/225523.htm; Plea Agreement, United States v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
No. 07-184 JDB (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f225500/225524.htm.
143 Plea Agreement, Qantas Airways Ltd., supra note 142; Plea Agreement, British Airways PLC, supra note 142; Plea Agreement, Korean Air Lines Co., supra
note 142.
144 Knibb & Conway, supra note 136.
139
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surcharges independently. 4 Reportedly, British Airways executives communicated extensively with rivals about planned movements in the surcharge rate.' 46
Notably, two airlines, Lufthansa and Virgin Atlantic, escaped
sanctions by entering an amnesty program with the Department
of Justice early on, and it became apparent that their cooperation was vital to securing the guilty pleas of British Airways, Korean Airlines, and Qantas. 147 Lufthansa also moved to extricate
itself quickly from
the civil suits discussed below with an $85 mil1 48
lion settlement.

However, the worldwide investigation grew even larger on October 10, 2007, when U.S. and European regulators launched a
similar spate of coordinated raids on the offices of major freight
forwarders, such as Expeditors International, Deutsche Post,
and Panalpina, with subpoenas to collect further evidence of
price-fixing through surcharges. 1 49 Industry sources indicated
that the investigators focused inquiry on accounting records between the forwarders and airlines that document how fuel
surcharges are invoiced and paid. 15 Some insiders speculated
that the airlines rewarded favored forwarders for their cooperation in the conspiracy by selectively rebating or15 forgiving fuel
surcharges, thus increasing profit on shipments.'
In December 2007, European Union regulators announced
charges against eleven carriers for violations of competition laws
for their fuel surcharge pricing practices, including British Airways, Air France-KLM Group, and Air Canada. 1 52 As it had in
Wilke et al., supra note 133.
See Dominic O'Connell, Catch Me If You Can, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug.
5, 2007.
147 Kevin Done, Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Michael Peel, More To Come In Aviation Price-FixingInvestigations, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 2007, at 15, available
at 2007 WLNR 16554910.
148 Robert Wall, Paying the Price,AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 6, 2007, at
46, available at 2007 WLNR 16708238.
149 Michael Fabey, ForwarderProbe Widens, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 22, 2007, at 29,
available at 2007 WLNR 20045292.
150 SurchargeProbe Targets Billing, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 3, 2007, at 29, available
at 2007 WLNR 23540959.
151 Geoffrey Arend, Arrests Reported In Air Cargo Price Fixing, AIR CARGO NEWS,
http://www.aircargonews.com/index071229Archive.htn
(last visited Jan. 23,
2008).
152 Europe Charges Airlines With Price Fixing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, at C4,
available at 2007 WLNR 25549723.
145
146
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the U.S. case, Lufthansa obtained conditional
immunity for its
53
cooperation in the European investigations.
F.

THE CIVIL CLASS ACTION SUITS

A slew of civil suits in the United States followed hot on the
heels of news of the criminal investigations naming most of the
major international airlines, including Lufthansa, British Airways, and Virgin Atlantic. 154 Twenty-three of these suits were
eventually consolidated and transferred to the Eastern District
of New York for pre-trial proceedings. 155 The suit filed by shippers in the Central District of California in March 2006 provides
a good example of the allegations leveled against the defendants
in this litigation.
The class-action suit names twenty-one different entities comprising some of the largest international air cargo carriers worldwide for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 156 After a
description of the size and scope of the airfreight industry and
the major players, the lawsuit describes the process by which the
air carriers imposed various surcharges, including security and
fuel surcharges, on both passenger and cargo fares, and details a
pattern of parallel increases in the level of fuel surcharges from
2000 to 2006.157 The plaintiff-shippers allege that this pattern
was the result of a conspiracy between the defendants to fix,
raise, and maintain prices on airfreight sold in the United States
and elsewhere. 158 To effectuate this conspiracy, the plaintiffs
maintain that the defendants participated in meetings and conversations to reach agreements to manipulate airfreight rates,
and that they issued price announcements and quotations in accord with those agreements. 159 The plaintiffs point to the airlines' membership in various trade associations and worldwide
industry group conferences in places such as Washington, D.C.,
Singapore, Dubai, Hong Kong, and Istanbul as evidence of these
meetings. 160
153 Id.
154 See,

e.g., Complaint at 1-2, Printing Techs., Inc. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,
No. CV06-1489 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006).
155 In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1342,
1343-44 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
156 Complaint at 4-10, Printing Techs., Inc. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No.
CV06-1489 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006).
157 See id. at 17-19.
158

Id.

159

Id. at 23-24.

16o See id. at 23-31.
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As noted above, Lufthansa managed to reach an $85 million
settlement with plaintiffs for release from the civil suits. 6 '
Other airlines, such as Air France-KLM Group, are still weighing
their options and attempting to measure their level of exposure
to criminal and civil liability. 161 For these airlines, the cost of
accepting a plea bargain could well be worth the risk of greater
civil damages at trial.' 63 Interestingly, no freight forwarders
were named in any of the current class action suits, and thus far,
no civil suits have been brought against forwarders, so it is unclear at present how these suits will ultimately affect them.
III.
A.

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS & MATSUSHITA
STANDARD FAIL TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS HAvE NOT AFFECTED CONCERTED

INCREASES IN FUEL SURCHARGES

As noted earlier, the surcharge controversy and surrounding
criminal and civil cases demonstrate the shortcomings of the
present approach of the courts in the application of antitrust
law to the oligopolistic pricing practices. In particular, the focus
of both the criminal and civil allegations on meetings and discussions between officers and executives of the accused corporations illustrates the "cops-and-robbers" mentality described by
Posner and the importance attached to the presence of an express agreement to construct a violation of Section 1. One inference to be drawn from this focus is that current enforcement of
the antitrust laws values punishment of classically-defined criminal conduct over the protection of consumers from the harmful
effects of such conduct, contrary to the original intent of the
legislation.
Ironically, the successful prosecution of British Airways, Korean Airlines, and Qantas demonstrate the perverse effect of the
current over-reliance on the conspiracy aspect of Section 1 violations at the expense of examining anticompetitive effects. Despite the fact that these high-profile convictions have generated
almost $1 billion in criminal fines, in addition to restitution payments from Lufthansa and Virgin Atlantic,16 1 they have provided
no effective relief to the consumers whom the antitrust laws are
161Wall, supra note 148, at 46.
See David Knibb, Cargo Confession Race, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 17, 2007, available

162

at 2007 WLNR 25953504.
Id.
- Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 140.

163
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supposed to protect. Far from abating, fuel charges have instead continued to increase in the same lockstep pattern of parallel action that prevailed before any investigation began, as the
table below demonstrates.
As of January 2008, the following is a sampling of fuel
surcharges on international air cargo for export from the
United States, levied by various air cargo carriers (including
some of those involved in the criminal cases) and freight
forwarders:
TABLE 1
Carrier
American Airlines
Air Canada
British Airways
Korean Airlines
Cargolux Airlines
Lufthansa Cargo

Effective as of
December
December
November
December
December
November

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

Freight Forwarder

Effective as of

DHL Global
EGL International
BAX Global

November 2007
December 2007
December 2007

.80
.75
.80
.80
.80
.79

Fuel Surcharge
USD per kilogram 165
6
USD per kilogram16
16 7
USD per kilogram
1 68
USD per kilogram
USD per kilogram1 6 9170
EURO per kilogram

Fuel Surcharge
17 1
.80 USD per kilogram1 72
.80 USD per kilogram 173
.80 USD per kilogram

165 AA Fuel Surcharge Instructions, Historical Fuel Surcharges, https://www.
aacargo.com/shipping/fuelsurcharge.jhtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
166 Fuel Index, http://www.aircanada.com/cargo/en/fuelindex/
(last visited Jan.
23, 2008).
167 Fuel Surcharge, http://www.baworldcargo.com/surcharges/
(last visited Jan.
23, 2008).
168 Fuel
Surcharge, http://cargo.koreanair.com/ecus/fpg/servlet/SurCharge
Servlet?version=eng&menul=menu6_l&menu2=menu6 (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
169 Cargolux Fuel Index, http://www.cargolux.com/services/surcharges.php
(last
visited Jan. 23, 2008).
170 British Airways and Lufthansa Cargo Hike Fuel Surcharge, Nov. 17, 2007, domainb.com Aviation & Aerospace,http://www.domain-b.com/aero/airlines/20071117fuel.html (Conversion from dollar to euro based on Jan. 18, 2008 exchange rate).
171 Fuel Surcharge Amendment - Update, http://www.dhl-dgf.com/frameset.cgi?
winLocation=http://www.dhl-dgf.com/worldwide/northamerica/resource/2007/
046.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
172 Press Release, E. Joseph Bento, President of Global Freight Management, EGL
(Nov. 26, 2007), available at http://www.cevalogistics.com/portal/page/portal/
CEVAHome/Solutions/CustomerTools/Fuel%20Surcharges/International%2OAir
freight% 20FSC/International% 20Airfreight% 20FSC%20112607pdf.pdf.
173 BAX
Global News, http://www.baxglobal.com/News/FuelSurcharge/US
International.aspx. (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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This table, while far from exhaustive, shows that the prosecutions have in no way dampened the airlines' enthusiasm toward
the fuel surcharges, and their only effect-if any at all 1 74 -has
been to punish and, hopefully, eliminate active collusion. Unfortunately, the oligopoly problem renders this little more than
a hollow victory for consumers.
If not impeded by legal action, the use of fuel surcharges will
only increase due to several new pressures on the air cargo market. High among these is the general fear of recession in the
U.S. market that could lead to an economic decline worldwide.1 75 Industry analysts predict the rate of growth of the airfreight market to diminish over the next few years, and indeed,
some carriers already feel the pinch: after six consecutive profitable quarters, American Airlines showed a $69 million loss in
1 76
the last quarter of 2007, which it attributed to rising fuel costs.
Even worse, the unexpected leap in oil prices to over $100 a
barrel has brought hedging activities-airlines' primary vehicle
to control costs-to a screeching halt. 177 All of these factors
could lead to greater reliance on fuel surcharges to sustain airfreight profits and greater incentive to collude-explicitly or
tacitly-to keep surcharges artificially high.
Further, instead of reducing their reliance on fuel surcharges
in reaction to the success of the criminal prosecutions, airlines
and freight forwarders have moved to reduce their exposure to
potential liability by curtailing activities that plaintiffs or regulators could use to sustain conspiracy charges. For example, industry insiders report that they have canceled trips to certain
forums and given greater scrutiny to the participation of their
executives in trade associations and their physical attendance at
conferences and meetings.1 7y In other words, at best, the proseThe only visible effect that the author could ascertain is that Lufthansa,
Virgin Atlantic, and Qantas no longer publish nor refer to the fuel surcharge
levied on air cargo on their corporate websites. Further, DHL has removed from
its website any description of the methodology the company uses to calculate fuel
surcharges, in response to the class action lawsuits. SeeJet Fuel Surcharge, http:/
/www.dhl.ch/publish/ch/en/information/shipping/fuel-surcharge.high.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
175See Mark Landler & Heather Timmons, World Markets Plunge on Fears of U.S.
Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at Al, availableat 2008 WLNR 1206334.
176 Business This Week, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 93, available at 2008 WLNR
949691.
177 See Justin Baer, Climbing Oil Prices Fuel U.S. Airlines' Fears, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 7, 2008, at 18.
178 See, e.g.,
Peter Conway, FearFactor: The Impact of Price-fixingAccusations on the
Air Cargo Industry, AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.flightglobal.com/arti174
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cutions have caused the industry to regulate their behaviors that
are the least directly harmful to consumers, or at worst, simply
made future conspiracies more difficult to detect.
B.

CURRENT APPROACH UNDER MATSUSHITA WILL
FAIL TO PROTECT CONSUMERS

If the same focus and associated bias toward punishing express collusion evident in the criminal investigations influence
the future disposition of the civil class action suits, the law will
function just as the near-sighted police officer described earlier,
and those conspirators just on the blurry edge will continue the
same damaging behavior undeterred. Under the current Matsushita standard, the civil class action suits will only survive summary judgment if the court finds sufficient "plus factors" to infer
the presence of active collusion among the defendants, which,
as discussed above, includes evidence that each defendant acted
contrary to its own economic self-interest or in a manner inexplicable in the absence of an illegal agreement.'
This could
prove a difficult hurdle, since the nature of the fuel surcharge
system almost perfectly exemplifies the oligopoly problem.
The key factor that implicates the oligopoly problem is that
the scheme functions just as effectively in the absence of active
collusion. In effect, the use of the spot-price index is a new
form of price signaling that eliminates the need for repeated
communications between competitors: once the spot-price index of trigger points is established and tied to corresponding
surcharges, the initiating firm has signaled its intentions for all
price levels to anyone with internet access. As fuel prices rise
and fall, each airline knows within a fraction of a cent how competitors will respond, and thus, that they themselves can safely
match that surcharge without risking a loss of trade volume.
The link between the surcharge and the price of fuel lends an
air of reasonableness to the practice that could be enough to
defeat a search for "plus factors." The natural defense that carriers raise to justify surcharges is that they are necessary to
recoup costs from the rapidly rising cost of fuel driven by recent
shocks in the oil market. The de-coupling of the fuel surcharge
from the base rate of airfreight and the use of a pre-determined
cles/2007/10/24/218777/fear-factor-the-impact-of-price-fixing-accusations-onthe-air-cargo.html.
179 See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th
Cir. 2003).
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index based on spot-prices gives the impression that the
surcharge is somehow revenue-neutral-that the carriers are
simply passing through the higher cost of fuel to consumers.
Thus, the defendants can assert that each is simply operating in
a manner directly in accord with its own economic self-interest.
If the court accepts this premise, then it is likely that claims
against carriers who did not directly participate in communications with other airlines about surcharge levels, as British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, and Lufthansa obviously did, will not
survive summary judgment. Plaintiffs will be stonewalled by the
"cops-and-robbers" approach described by Posner.
This would be unfortunate, because in practical terms no
such pass-through relationship exists. First, because the
surcharge is applied by chargeable weight, it makes no distinction between the difference in fuel consumed on short-haul
flights and long-haul routes. Second, because freight forwarders
purchase a majority of the carriers' cargo capacity six months to
a year in advance, the surcharges being "passed through" to consignors at the time of shipment are out of phase. Third, there is
no economic evidence that the almost-uniform scheduled step
increases of five to ten cents per kilogram correlated to various
trigger-points in the spot-price index have any meaningful relationship to operating costs.
Based on the multitude and complexity of factors that affect
the actual fuel cost borne by the airlines-including hedging
activities and differences in operating efficiencies and economies of scale between carriers-it seems highly unlikely that the
"one size fits all" pattern of fuel surcharges is anything other
than arbitrary. If this is so, then the segmentation of airfreight
rates into a base rate and a fuel surcharge rate is a distinction
without economic substance, and thus one would expect fuel
surcharges among carriers to be subject to the same price competition as their base rates. In other words, in the absence of
tacit or express collusion to maintain the rigid index system, fuel
surcharges should fluctuate just as base airfreight rates do: in
response to demand in the market, not in a contrived relation to
an underlying commodity. In fact, the passenger market displays this trend, 8 ' even while uniform surcharges on cargo rates
have persisted.

180 Major Airlines Abandon HigherFuel Surcharges,TULSA WORLD, Jan. 23, 2008, at
E6, available at 2008 WLNR 1345500. A retreat by Northwest forced American,
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Although the segmentation of airfreight rates may have no
realistic economic basis, it allows carriers to increase revenue
collusively while maintaining the illusion of competition."' 1 For
example, a recent Banc of America survey of base airfreight
showed that for most of 2007, trans-Atlantic prices showed only
small increases, while trans-Pacific rates were flat or even falling.1 2 During
that same time, however, fuel surcharges steadily
83
advanced.1

C. A

PROPOSED APPROACH TowARD TACIT COLLUSION

The civil class action suits provide an opportunity to tailor the
application of Section 1 to more effectively counter the oligopoly problem by recognizing that, at least in some instances, tacit
collusion is just as damaging to consumers as active collusion.
To meet this opportunity, the court should apply Section 1 in a
manner that protects both consumers and truly independent action by participants in concentrated markets.
A melding of the approaches suggested by Posner and Piraino
discussed above would adequately address these concerns. This
proposed approach would take the form of the two-step inquiry
proposed by Posner, which begins with an examination of the
8 4
industry at issue to determine susceptibility toward collusion.
In the second prong of the test, the court would inspect any
pattern of parallel conduct in accord with Posner's analysis, but
with a purpose-based inquiry as described by Piraino. i s5 If the

conduct is undertaken contrary to the participant's economic
self-interest, as shown by the risk of immediate loss of revenue or
profits, then sufficient basis would exist to find an illegal conspiracy or combination under Section 1. In the context of the
air cargo litigation, the application of these approaches to a rule
Delta, and United Airlines to roll back fuel surcharges-but only on passenger
fares. Id.
181 See Baker, supra note 64, at 166. Baker describes how Northwest thwarted a
price increase on round-trip passenger fares initiated by Continental Airlines in
February 2000, however, Continental had successfully led the implementation of
an increased fuel surcharge just three weeks earlier. Id.
182 Trans-Atlantic Air Rates Rise, TRAFFic WORLD, Jan. 3, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 222575.
183 See, e.g., American Airlines Cargo Fuel Surcharge Instructions, supra note
129.
184 See discussion supra Part I.C for full description of Posner's proposed
approach.
185 See discussion supra Part I.D for full description of Piraino's proposed
approach.
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of reason analysis of anticompetitive impact would almost certainly find that the current use of fuel surcharges in the air
cargo industry is an unreasonable restraint on trade or commerce, regardless of whether it is the product of active or tacit
collusion.
D.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO
AIR CARGO FUEL SURCHARGES

To begin with, as shown above, the airfreight industry
manifests many, if not all, of Posner's economic attributes that
identify susceptibility to collusion: concentration of relatively
few sellers, significant barriers to entry in the form of high capital investment costs, and a standardized, fungible product.'86
Further, because of the high-value and often perishable nature
of airfreight goods, demand is probably inelastic at the competitive price.' 87
Ample evidence is also present to show a pattern of collusive
behavior sufficient to satisfy the second element of Posner's inquiry. As already noted, the various indexes of fuel spot-prices
function as one giant mechanism to exchange prospective price
information between the airlines, and a pattern of parallel action in response is evident. 88 Moreover, the operation of the
spot-price indexes resembles another practice identified by Posner as an indicator of collusion: base-point pricing. Both basepoint pricing and the indexed system of fuel surcharges impose
uniform levels of charges that bear no direct relationship to underlying expenses, but are instead tied to some other variable:
the location of the base point in one case and fuel spot-prices in
the other. This indicates that the motivation behind each pricing scheme is not to recoup expenses but to stabilize prices.
The final element of a demonstrably anticompetitive effect on
the market would require economic analysis outside the scope
of this comment, but, given the fact that in some cases fuel
surcharges exceed the base airfreight rate on some routes, it is
likely that plaintiffs could establish that airfreight prices exceed
the competitive rate.
Grafting the purpose-based inquiry proposed by Piraino into
the second prong represents a less radical departure from the
current approach that would preserve an element of intent or
186

See discussion supra Part II.A.

187 Id.
188

See discussion supra Parts II.D, E, & F.
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mens rea in the analysis, yet still recognize and combat the effects
of tacit collusion. The key element to establish under this analysis is that each defendant acted contrary to its own economic
self-interest as a result of the agreement, such as through the
announcement of planned price increases at the risk of loss of
profits or revenue. Again, the price-signaling aspects of the fuel
surcharge index system and the resultant pattern of uniform increases by carriers demonstrate offer and acceptance to participate in a price-fixing scheme necessary to form a conspiracy in
Piraino's view.
One last element of the purpose-based inquiry remains: to distinguish truly independent action from the requisite purpose to
engage in a conspiracy, either expressly or tacitly, Piraino suggests that the court look to whether the announcement was
made with a business purpose. 8 9 Using the airline industry as
an example, Piraino notes that communications of planned increases in passenger rates have such ajustification, since customers use this information to plan their travels. 90
This leads to an interesting result in the context of fuel
surcharges, since the same justification does not apply toward
shippers of airfreight, who make regular, recurring purchases
rather than sporadic flights. Thus, the application of a purposebased approach could lead to a grant of summary judgment regarding claims for surcharges on passenger fares, while claims
for surcharges on cargo would survive. While perhaps counterintuitive, this result would nonetheless be in accord both with
the concept of a continuum of regulation of questioned practices in relation to their anticompetitive effects and with the disparate behavior of fuel surcharge levels displayed between the
cargo market and the passenger market.
While this admixture of approaches surely has its own drawbacks, it nonetheless addresses the dual concern that any sanction of tacit collusion necessarily entails-protecting consumers
from anticompetitive prices while preserving the economic efficiency of interdependent-yet-independent action in oligopolistic
markets.
D.

LOOKING FORWARD

No matter what course the air cargo litigation ultimately
takes, if a stronger emphasis on the anticompetitive effects of
189See Piraino, supra note 57, at 39.
190 Id.
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fuel surcharges-and toward tacit collusion in general-does
not surface, the original intent of the Sherman Act (to protect
consumers) will continue to be thwarted. A consumer feels the
sting of anticompetitive prices regardless of whether the price is
the result of a shady deal in a smoke-filled room or of conscious
participation in an unspoken agreement. In most cases, the
forces of the marketplace supply the needed level of protection,
but in concentrated, oligopolistic industries, those intrinsic safeguards break down. In these instances, it is appropriate for the
law to intervene to fill the gap.
The current imposition of fuel surcharges in the international
air cargo market is an example of one of those instances. All
consumers suffer the effects of uncompetitive prices on airfreight through higher retail prices on the goods shipped. Unfortunately, the punishment of a few blatant conspirators has
not deterred the pattern of collusion that exists in setting and
maintaining the rates of surcharges above a competitive level.
The solution to this problem requires an expansion of the current application of antitrust law to focus more on the effect than
the intent of questionable business practices to provide better
consumer protection in keeping with the goals of the legislation. As noted at the beginning, punishing bad actors is indeed
a worthy goal, but ultimately the pursuit has little meaning if
consumers still pay the price for the collusion. Catching the bad
guys may be good, but making sure consumers are no longer
getting robbed is even better.

